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Abstract. The general individual (non-coherent) attack on the ping–
pong protocol with completely entangled pairs of three–dimensional 
quantum systems (qutrits) is analyzed. The expression for amount of the 
eavesdropper’s information as functions from probability of attack detection 
is derived. It is shown, that the security of the ping–pong protocol with pairs 
of qutrits is higher the security of the protocol with pairs of qubits. It is also 
shown, that with the use by legitimate users in a control mode two mutually 
unbiased measuring bases the ping–pong protocol with pairs of qutrits, 
similar to the protocol with groups of qubits, possesses only asymptotic 
security and requires additional methods for its security amplification. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Now the quantum cryptography is one of the quickly developing applications of the quantum 
information theory and offers the new based on the quantum physics’ laws approach to the solving 
of the important problem of telecommunication channels protection from eavesdropping by the not 
authorised persons. One of quantum cryptography directions is quantum secure direct 
communication protocols [1–8], in which a confidential message coded in quantum states is 
transmitted by a quantum communication channel without preliminary enciphering of the message.  
One of the quantum secure direct communication protocol is the ping–pong protocol which 
can be realised with completely entangled states of pairs or groups of qubits. Some variants of the 
ping–pong protocol with qubits are developed, and also their security against various attacks is 
investigated [1, 2, 5–13]. Usage instead of qubits the quantum systems with high dimension will 
allow increasing information capacity of a source. So, the protocol with completely entangled 
three–dimensional quantum systems (qutrits) and quantum superdense coding for qutrits have the 
capacity 17.39log 2   bits on a cycle instead of two bits on a cycle for the protocol with pairs of 
qubits. Notice, that from the technological point of view to operate with qutrits is more difficult so 
far than with qubits, however, a series of experiments on creation of entangled qutrit pairs is carried 
out by the present time [14, 15].  
The quantum secure direct communication protocol with entangled pairs of qutrits, using the 
scheme of the ping–pong protocol, and also the transmition of qutrits by blocks was offered by 
Wang et al. [16]. However, such protocol with qutrits transmited by blocks requires great quantum 
memory from both users. At the same time the original scheme of the ping–pong protocol requires 
quantum memory for storage of one qubit (or qutrit) only from the receiver of the message during 
one cycle of the protocol. However, ping–pong protocol with groups of entangled qubits in 
Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states possesses only asymptotic security against general 
individual attack [1, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13]. For the protocol with qutrits such attack by this time is not 
analysed. In this paper the analysis of general individual attack against the ping–pong protocol with 
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entangled pairs of qutrits is carried out; and also the comparison of security of this protocol with 
security of the protocols with qubits is fulfilled. 
 
2. THE PING–PONG PROTOCOL WITH COMPLETELY 
ENTANGLED PAIRS OF QUTRITS 
There are nine completely entangled orthonormalized states of qutrit pair (Bell states of 
qutrit pair) [16]:   322110000  ;    3221100 343210 ii ee   ;   3221100 323420 ii ee   ;   320120101  ;   3201201 343211 ii ee   ;   3201201 323421 ii ee   ;   321100202  ;    3211002 343212 ii ee   ;   3211002 323422 ii ee   .       (1) 
These states can be transformed one into another by the action of local unitary operations on 
one of qutrits from pair [16]. Thus, there is a possibility to realise quantum superdense coding for 
pair of qutrits, i.e. transmitting by a quantum communication channel only one qutrit from pair pass 
two classical trit of information.  
The receiver (Bob) prepares one of two–qutrit states (1), let it be the state 00 , and then 
sends one of qutrits to the sender (Alice). Let Bob stores the first qutrit, the “home” qutrit and sends 
the second one, the "travel" qutrit. 
Alice performs one of nine coding operations on the received qutrit, according to pair 
classical trits (ternary bigram) which she wishes to send. For example, the state 00  corresponds 
to "00", 10  corresponds to "10", 20  corresponds to "20" etc. Alice and Bob agree about such 
conformity in advance. Then Alice sends the travel qutrit back to Bob, and he performs a Bell–basis 
measurement on both qutrits, representing a set from nine operators  ijij  , where i, j = 0…2. 
Bob precisely defines a states created by Alice’s coding operation, and, accordingly, ternary bigram 
which it has sent. The described sequence of operations is called as a message mode. Alice’s coding 
operations, that transform state 00  into states 00 … 22 , are given by: 
22110000 U ;   221100 343210 ii eeU   ; 
221100 323420
ii eeU   ; 20120101 U ; 
201201 343211
ii eeU   ; 201201 323421 ii eeU   ; 
21100202 U ;   211002 343212 ii eeU   ; 
211002 323422
ii eeU   .       (2) 
As the eavesdropper (Eve) has no access to home qutrit, stored in Bob quantum memory 
during one cycle of the protocol, she cannot gain any information having simply intercepted travel 
qutrit on the way Alice   Bob and having measured its state. The state of travel qutrit is 
completely mixed; its reduced density matrix is  221100
3
1 red . However, Eve has 
the possibility to perform an attack with the additional quantum systems (ancillas) entangled with 
travel qutrit on the way Bob   Alice (fig. 1). Then Eve performs measurement on the composed 
quantum system "travel qutrit – ancilla" on the way Alice   Bob (entanglement–and–
measurement attack strategy). Therefore, except message mode in the ping–pong protocol it is also 
necessary control mode allowing to detect eavesdropper's operation. 
Alice randomly switches to control mode with some probability q. In this mode Alice does 
not perform coding operations (2), but randomly chooses one of mutually unbiased 
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(complementary) measuring basis, measures state of the travel qutrit in this basis and informs Bob 
via public classical channel a result of measurement and the chosen basis. 
 
FIG. 1: The attack scheme on the ping–pong protocol with pairs of qutrits 
(S  is a source of entangled qutrit pairs) 
 
There are four mutually unbiased bases for qutrits from which two are called z–basis and x–
basis [16], and other two we will designate as v–basis and t–basis: 
00 z ,  11 z ,  22 z ;   (3) 
  32100 x ,   3210 32321 ii eex   ,   3210 32322 ii eex   ;      (4) 
  3210320  iev ,   3210 321  iev ,   3210 322 iev  ;      (5) 
  3210320   iet ;   3210 321   iet ;   3210 322 iet  .      (6) 
Measurement in any of these bases gives one of three possible results: "0", "1" or "2", each 
with probability equal to 31 . Having received from Alice the result of measurement and the chosen 
basis, Bob performs measurement of home qutrit state. Thus Bob should choose measuring basis 
according to the rules which follow from the form of 00  in all four bases (3) – (6):      33221100 12210000 xxxxxx      33 221100221100 tvtvtvvtvtvt  .    (7) 
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This expression is derived by direct calculation of projective operators' actions in bases (4) – 
(6) on state 00 , which has been written in computational basis (3), i.e.   322110000  .  
From the formula (7) the rules follow for Bob measurement. So, if Alice has chosen z-basis 
and has drawn the result "0" Bob should choose also z-basis and its result with determinacy will be 
"0". Similarly, if Alice result at measurement in z–basis is "1" or "2" Bob also should draw "1" or 
"2" in this basis accordingly. If Alice has chosen x-basis, so Bob should choose this basis. At Alice 
results are "0", "1" or "2" (corresponding to the states 0x , 1x  and 2x ) Bob with determinacy 
will draw "0", "2" or "1" accordingly. If Alice will choose v-basis then according to the (7) Bob 
should choose t-basis, and on the contrary, and the results of Bob measurements depending on 
Alice's results also follow from the expression (7).  
If Bob results differ from above, this means that the state 00  is changed by the transmission 
of qutrit from Bob to Alice. It can be caused by two reasons: Eve's attack or noise in a quantum 
communication channel. In this paper I do not consider the implementation of the ping–pong protocol 
with entangled qutrits in the noise channel and I consider that legitimate users use the ideal quantum 
channel. In that case the discrepancy of Bob measurement result to the expected one means Eve's 
attack and legitimate users should interrupt a communication session immediately. However, for the 
ping–pong protocol with groups of entangled qubits Eve's attack does not lead to that Alice and Bob 
find out the change of the state prepared by Bob at once at the first control mode. In protocols with 
qubits Eve's attacking operation is found out for one round of the control mode only with some 
probability and legitimate users should perform a certain quantity of rounds to make probability of 
attack detection as much as close to unit [1, 5, 6, 9, 10]. For the ping–pong protocol with entangled 
pairs of qutrits the situation will be similar. A concrete number of control mode rounds necessary for 
attack detection with the probability set beforehand it is possible to find out having analysed the Eve's 
eavesdropping attack. Results of such an analysis are presented in the following section of the paper.  
 
3. GENERAL INDIVIDUAL ATTACK USING QUANTUM ANCILLAS AGAINST        
THE PING–PONG PROTOCOL WITH ENTANGLED PAIRS OF QUTRITS 
According to the scheme of the ping–pong protocol Alice informs Bob via the public channel 
on switching to control mode after reception of travel qutrit from Bob. Eve listening in this channel 
learns about switching to control mode after attacking operation Eˆ , but before its final 
measurement (fig. 1). Hence, in this case Eve will not perform the measurement. Thus, legitimate 
users can detect only an attacking operation Eˆ  on a line Bob   Alice. 
Due to the Stinespring dilation theorem [17] Eve's attacking operation Eˆ  can be realised by 
an unitary operator on a Hilbert space of ancillas EH  which dimension satisfies the condition 
 2dimdim BE HH  , where 3dim BH  is the dimension of travel qutrit Hilbert space. Thus, Eve 
can use for attack the ancillas consisting from one or two qutrits. Attack using two-qutrits ancillas is 
more general and accordingly stronger, therefore we will analyse this attack. 
As the state of travel qutrit is completely mixed, so similarly to the ping–pong protocol with 
qubits [1, 5, 8] it is possible to consider, that Bob sends qutrit in one of the states 0 , 1  or 2  with 
identical probability equal to 31 . 
Thus, states of composite system "travel qutrit – Eve's ancilla" after an attack Eˆ  can be 
written as 
 
020010000
0 ,2,1,0,0ˆ  E ; 
 
121111101
1 ,2,1,0,1ˆ  E ; 
 
222212202
2 ,2,1,0,2ˆ  E ,   (8) 
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where  ij  ( i, j = 0…2) is set of two-qutrit states of Eve's ancilla. 
Matrix representation of Eve’s attacking operation is 












210
210
210
Eˆ       (9) 
Since Eˆ  has to be unitary the following relations between parameters of Eve's ancillas must 
be fulfilled: 
ijjijiji  *** ,     (10) 
where ij  is Kronecker delta, i, j = 0 … 2. 
Also for the reason that a state of travel qutrit is completely mixed the following relations 
must be fulfilled: 
2
2
2
1
2
0  ; 202221  ; 212022  .  (11) 
Let's consider at first the case where Bob "sends 0 ". In this case the state of system "travel 
qutrit – Eve's ancilla" after attack Eˆ  becomes  0  (see (8)).  
After the performance (by Alice) of coding operations 00U , 10U , 20U , 01U , … (2) with 
frequencies 00p , 10p , 20p , 01p , …  respectively, the density operator of system "travel qutrit – 
Eve's ancilla" will look like: 
     02
0,
00
ij
ji
ijijp  

,     (12) 
where 
   
020010000
0
00
0
00 ,2,1,0  U , 
   
02
34
001
32
0000
0
10
0
10 ,2,1,0   ii eeU , 
   
02
32
001
34
0000
0
20
0
20 ,2,1,0   ii eeU , 
   
020010000
0
20
0
01 ,0,2,1  U , 
   
02
34
001
32
0000
0
11
0
11 ,0,2,1   ii eeU , 
   
02
32
001
34
0000
0
21
0
21 ,0,2,1   ii eeU , 
   
020010000
0
02
0
02 ,1,0,2  U , 
   
02
34
001
32
0000
0
12
0
12 ,1,0,2   ii eeU , 
   
02
32
001
34
0000
0
12
0
22 ,1,0,2   ii eeU .     (13) 
The maximal amount 0I  of classical information which is accessible to Eve after 
measurement on composite system "travel qutrit – ancilla" is defined by Holevo entropy [18]: 
        02
0,
00
0  

SSpSI
ji
ijij ,                                               (14) 
where      000 ijijij  ; S is von Neumann entropy and all   0ijS   are equal to zero, as the states 
(13) at the conditions (10) are pure. Thus, 
         
i
iiTrSI 3
0
3
00
0 loglog  (trit),   (15) 
where i  are eigenvalues of the density operator  0  (12).  
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The quantity of 0I  shows how much information Eve can gain after final measurement on 
composite system "travel qutrit – ancilla". 
For finding of eigenvalues i  density operator  0  (12) has been written in a matrix kind in 
the following orthogonal basis:  020202010101000000 ,2,,1,,0,,2,,1,,0,,2,,1,,0  .  (16) 
The deduced matrix has the size 99   and here is not shown so the resultant expression is 
cumbersome. 
By means of Wolfram Mathematica 7 symbolic toolkit it has been found, that the equation on 
eigenvalues for this density matrix can be factorized to three cubic equations of a following kind: 
      20102000100020202020202022010003 3 ppppppppp  
027 201000
2
0
2
0
2
0  ppp ; 
      21112101110120202020202022111013 3 ppppppppp  
027 211101
2
0
2
0
2
0  ppp ; 
      22122202120220202020202022212023 3 ppppppppp  
027 221202
2
0
2
0
2
0  ppp .        (17) 
Other cases in (8) are similarly considered, i.e. when Bob instead of 0  "sends 1  or 2 ". In 
these cases the eigenvalues of the density matrix  1  and  2  taking into account relations (11) are 
defined by the same equations (17). 
As it follows from the first expression in (8), in the case when Bob "sends 0 " and in control 
mode the measuring basis z is used, a probability to detect an attack is: 
2
0
2
0
2
0 1 zd .     (18) 
Similarly, if Bob "sends 1  or 2 " then 
2
0
2
1
2
1
2
1 11 zd   and   20222222 11 zd     (19) 
accordingly, taking into account relations (11). Thus, the general expression for probability of 
attack detection with using z-basis in control mode is defined by (18). 
Using the expression (18) from the equations (17) it is possible for a case of Eve’s symmetric 
attack ( 220
2
0 zd ) to exclude parameters 0 , 0  and 0  of ancillas having entered in the 
equations (17) probability of an attack detection zd . It will finally allow to express Eve’s amount of 
information 0I  (15) through zd . 
As at symmetric attack  
2
120
2
0
2
0
2
0
z
z
dd , 
4
2
2
0
2
0
zd  and 
 
4
1
2
2
0
2
0
2
0
z
z
dd , the equations (17) become: 
      0
4
27
4
33 201000
32
201020001000
22
201000
3 

  pppddppppppddppp zzzz ; 
      0
4
27
4
33 211101
32
211121011101
22
211101
3 

  pppddppppppddppp zzzz ; 
      0
4
27
4
33 221202
32
221222021202
22
221202
3 

  pppddppppppddppp zzzz .   (20) 
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On the fig. 2 dependences of 0I  from zd  are shown at Eve's symmetric attack and various 
values of frequencies 00p … 22p  of Alice’s coding operations (tab. 1). For acquisition of these 
dependences the equations (20) were solved numerically at some values of 00p … 22p  and the 
obtained nine values 1 … 9  were substituted in the equation (15). 
  
Tab. 1. Frequencies 00p … 22p  of ternary bigram and corresponding source entropy 



2
0,
3log
ji
ijij ppH   (trit/bigramm)  
Number of curve on fig. 2 00p  10p 20p  01p 11p  21p 02p  12p  22p  H 
1 91  91 91  91 91  91 91  91  91  2.000
2 61  91 181 61 181 91 181  91  61  1.921
3 92  0 92  0 92  0 92  0 91  1.439
4 0.4 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 1.086
5 32  0 0 0 31  0 0 0 0 0.579
 
 
FIG. 2: Dependences of Eve’s amount of information 0I  
from probability zd  of attack detection at symmetric attack 
 
Apparently from the fig. 2, for the majority of sets 00p … 22p  amount of Eve’s information 0I  
monotonously grows with increase of attack detection probability zd  and reaches a maximum at 
32zd  (for some special sets of bigram frequencies the 0I  does not depend on zd  at all and is a 
constant). It is possible to consider the value 32zd  as a maximum so at 32zd  amount of 
Eve’s information starts to decrease (on fig. 2 it is not shown). Accordingly, Eve will not choose 
parameters of the ancillas on which the zd  depends so that zd  would exceed 32 , since for her is 
not meaningful to increase probability of attack detection at reduction of information accessible to 
her. Also it is visible from the fig. 2 that a maximum of Eve’s amount of information corresponding 
to 32zd  is equal to entropy of a message source at any sets of frequencies 00p … 22p . It means 
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that at 32zd  and only at such value of zd  Eve have the full information. Also the fact that 0I  is 
equal to H at 32zd  testifies about correct asymptotics of formulas (20). 
It is visible from the fig. 2 also that at 0zd  Eve’s amount of information does not equal to 
zero, however it is below its maximum value at 32zd . Thus, for the ping–pong protocol with 
entangled pairs of qutrits there is an "invisible" mode at which Eve obtaines the partial information, 
but its operations cannot be detected by legitimate users when they use only one measuring basis in 
control mode. Notice that the similar situation takes place and for the ping–pong protocol with 
entangled groups of qubits [5, 9, 10]. Therefore it is necessary to consider probabilities of attack 
detection at use by legitimate users in control mode other bases (4) – (6), and also dependences 
between these probabilities. 
 
4. PROBABILITIES OF ATTACK DETECTION AT USE BY 
LEGITIMATE USERS X – V – AND T–BASES 
Let's discuss Eve's attack considering that owing to full mixing of a travel qutrit state this 
qutrit is now in one of the states 0x , 1x  or 2x  (4). Then formulas (8) are replaced with the 
following: 
 
0220011000000
0 ,,,,ˆ  xcxbxaxEx ; 
 
1221111110011
1 ,,,,ˆ  xcxbxaxEx ; 
 
2222211220022
2 ,,,,ˆ  xcxbxaxEx .            (21) 
Further, all formulas (9) – (17) remain fair at replacement 00 a , 00 b , 00 c , 
11 a , 11 b  etc. Thus, expression (18) is replaced with expression 
2
0
2
0
2
0 1 acbdx  .     (22) 
Using (8) and (21) it is possible to derive the following expressions connecting parameters 0 , 
0  and 0  with parameters 0a , 0b  and 0c : 
2
000
2
0 3
1 cba  ,  2032032020 3
1 cebea ii   ,  2032032020 3
1 cebea ii   .  (23) 
In the tab. 2 some calculated sets of parameters 0a , 0b  and 0c  satisfying to the relations 
similar to (10) and (11), and also corresponded to this parameters sets values of xd  and zd   are 
presented. Values of zd  are obtained with the use of (18) and the first formula in (23).  
 
Tab. 2. Parameters of attacking operation and corresponding to them values of xd and zd  
0a  0b  0c  xd  zd  
Nonsymmetric attack: 20
2
0 cb   
–0.910684   0.244017 –0.333333 0.170655 0.666667 
–0.807162   0.309719 –0.502558 0.348490 0.666667 
–0.709081   0.331451 –0.622370 0.497204   0.666667 
–0.666667   0.333333 –0.666667 0.555556 0.666667 
–0.577406   0.325969 –0.748563 0.666603 0.666667 
  0.530210 – 0.8i   0.169304 – 0.1i   0.014630 + 0.2i 0.078878 0.666667 
–0.909127 + 0.1i –0.133042 – 0.2i   0.125653 – 0.3i 0.163489 0.666667 
  0.204236 + 0.83i   0.026660 – 0.3i   0.136663 + 0.4i 0.269388 0.666667 
  0.737034 + 0.3i –0.031581 – 0.5i   0.160573 – 0.3i 0.366781 0.666667 
  0.674712 + 0.3i   0.525520 + 0.2i –0.220436 – 0.3i 0.454764 0.666667 
–0.531662 + 0.3i   0.463325 + 0.2i –0.531662 + 0.3i 0.627335 0.666667 
–0.497557+0.293i   0.459068 + 0.2i –0.570890 + 0.3i 0.666667 0.666667 
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Symmetric attack: 20
2
0 cb   
–0.953939 + 0.1i –0.2i –0.2i 0.08 0.666667 
  0.305505 + 0.8i   0.305505 – 0.2i   0.305505 – 0.2i 0.266667 0.666667 
  0.027387 + 0.7i   0.463276 – 0.2i   0.463276 – 0.2i 0.50925 0.666667 
  0.577350 –0.288675 + 0.5i –0.288675 + 0.5i 0.666667 0.666667 
  0.577350i   0.5 – 0.288675i 0.5 – 0.288675i 0.666667 0.666667 
  0.577350   0.288675 + 0.5i   0.288675 + 0.5i 0.666667 0.222222 
 
The unitarity of Eve’s attacking operation leads to the important dependence between zd  and 
xd , namely: without dependence from value of one of these quantities the second is always equal to 
the maximum value (see tab. 2). Thus, at use of two measuring bases in control mode an "invisible" 
mode does not exist any more and the ping–pong protocol with Bell pairs of entangled qutrits 
possesses asymptotic security like protocols with groups of entangled qubits [1, 5, 9, 10].  
In a similar way the attack can be analysed at use by legitimate users of v–basis (5) and t–
basis (6). The calculations show that the above–stated rules for zd  and xd  is fair for any of pairs 
zd – xd , zd – vd , zd – td , xd – vd , xd – td , vd – td : without dependence from value of one of these 
quantities the second is always equal to the maximum value. From here follows that for 
eavesdropping detection it is enough for legitimate users to choose any two mutually unbiased bases 
from four possible. 
At use in control mode two measuring bases (for example, z and x) probability to detect Eve's 
attacking operation is 
xxzz dqdqd  ,                                                              (24) 
where zq  and xq  are probabilities of use by Alice and Bob z– and x–bases accordingly 
( 1 xz qq ). The least values of zd  and xd  are equal to zero but when one of these quaitities is 
equal to zero, another is equal to maximum value 32 . As legitimate users do not foreknow what 
attack strategy will be chosen by Eve, i.e. in what of bases she will aspire to create smaller value of 
detection probability, values zq  and xq  will be reasonable for choosing equal each other, i.e. 
21 xz qq . Then the least value of d will turn out, when or 0zd  and 32xd , or on the 
contrary. According to (24) under such circumstances     313221 d , i.e. the minimum value 
of attack detection probability at use in control mode two measuring bases equals to 31 . Notice, 
that at such strategy Eve will obtain only partial information about the transmited string of trits. If 
Eve wants to obtain full information it should choose parameters of ancillas so that 32 xz dd  
and thus, according to (24), 32d . 
 
5. COMPARISON OF SECURITY LEVEL OF PROTOCOLS 
WITH QUTRITS AND WITH QUBITS 
Let's now compare dependences of Eve’s amount of information on probability of attack 
detection for protocol with Bell pairs of qutrits and protocols with groups of qubits.  On fig. 3 
dependences 0I  from zd  for protocol with pairs of qutrits are shown at 912200  pp  , and 
also for protocol with pairs of qubits and quantum superdense coding [5], protocol with GHZ–
triplets [9] and protocol with GHZ–quadruples of qubits [19] at identical values of frequencies of 
Alice’s coding operations. It is visible, that the curve  zdI 0  for the protocol with qutrits lays close 
to corresponding curve for the protocol with GHZ–triplets of qubits. Also information capacities of 
these two variants of the ping–pong protocol are also close: 3.17 bits on a cycle for protocol with 
pairs of qutrits and 3 bits on a cycle for protocol with GHZ–triplets of qubits. 
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FIG. 3: Dependences of Eve’s amount of information on probability of attack detection. 
The protocol: with Bell pairs of qutrits (1); with GHZ–quadruples of qubits (2); 
with GHZ–triplets of qubits (3); with Bell pairs of qubits (4). 
 
In the tab. 3 the minimum and maximum values of attack’s detection probability for these 
four variants of the ping–pong protocol are shown at use in control mode two measuring bases with 
the same probabilities 21 xz qq . Apparently from the tab. 3, values mind  and maxd  for protocol 
with Bell pairs of qutrits are also closest to corresponding values for protocol with GHZ–triplets of 
qubits. 
 
Tab. 3. Minimum mind  and maximum maxd  values of attack's detection probability at use in control 
mode two measuring bases with equal probabilities 
Protocol mind maxd
with Bell pairs of qutrits 31  32  
with Bell pairs of qubits 41  21  
with GHZ–triplets of qubits 83  43  
with GHZ–quadruples of qubits 167 87  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper a general individual attack on the ping–pong protocol with Bell pairs of three–
dimensional quantum systems is analysed. The density matrix of composite quantum system "travel 
qutrit – eavesdropper's ancilla" is obtained and by calculating of density matrix eigenvalues the 
expression is obtained for amount of eavesdropper’s information as functions of attack’s detection 
probability.  
It is shown, that at use for protocol implementation Bell pairs of qutrits instead of Bell pairs 
of qubits not only information capacity increases, but also security level of protocol to attack, as the 
maximum probability of eavesdropping detection (at the one-time run of control mode) for protocol 
with qutrits is equal to 32 , and for protocol with qubits is equal to 21 . Security of the protocol 
with pairs of qutrits appears approximately same, as the protocol with GHZ–triplets of qubits. Also 
for protocol with pairs of qutrits, similar to the protocol with groups of qubits, there is an "invisible" 
mode if legitimate users use in control mode only one measuring basis. Use of the second 
measuring basis eliminates the possibility of undetectable attacks and, hence, is necessary.  
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At use in control mode two measuring bases the ping–pong protocol with Bell pairs of qutrits, 
similar to the protocol with groups of qubits, possesses only asymptotic security as for detection of 
eavesdropping with the probability as much as close to unit, it is necessary for legitimate users to 
perform a certain quantity of control mode rounds. Thus, as the control mode is necessary for 
alternating with the message mode (differently the eavesdropper will not make attacking operations 
at all as he will know that the message is not transmitting) some amount of information will leak to 
the eavesdropper. An estimation of this amount depending on parameters of protocol and 
eavesdropping strategy, and also necessary arrangements on security amplification of the ping–pong 
protocol with qutrits will be a subject of the following paper. 
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